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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) is evaluating
options of reuse of its historic Hangar 1. As a part of this
evaluation, a qualitative fire risk assessment study was
performed to evaluate the potential threat of combustion of the
historic hangar. The study focused on the fire risk trade-off of
either installing or not installing a Special Hazard Fire
Suppression System in the Hangar 1 deck areas.
The assessment methodology was useful in discussing the
important issues among various groups within the Center.
Once the methodology was deemed acceptable, the results
were assessed. The results showed that the risk remained in
the same risk category, whether Hangar 1 does or does not
have a Special Hazard Fire Suppression System. Note that the
methodology assessed the risk to Hangar 1 and not the risk to
an aircraft in the hangar. If one had a high value aircraft, the
aircraft risk analysis could potentially show a different result.
The assessed risk results were then communicated to
management and other stakeholders.
1 INTRODUCTION
In the early 1930s the Naval Air Station Sunnyvale,
California was commissioned to house the USS Macon, a U.S.
Naval Airship (dirigible). It is now part of a Historic District
[1] consisting of a large number of buildings that were
constructed from the 1930s on. By far the most famous and
visible site is Hangar 1 which is visible from the nearby
freeways and from the air. Hangar 1 housed the USS Macon,
and was named as a Naval Historical Monument in the early
1950s. The floor covers eight acres and can accommodate 10
football fields; it is 1,133 feet long and 308 feet wide with
walls forming an elongated dome 198 feet high.
Hangar 1 is the center of a debate over its future as its
external structure was leaking toxic chemicals into the ground
water. The US Navy has coated the exterior panels with an
encapsulant and is evaluating options for remediating the toxic
chemicals permanently. During this process, NASA ARC is
evaluating options for the maximum practicable use of Hangar
1 subsequent to its proposed restoration. Potential uses of the
hangar include storage and light, non-hazardous maintenance
(unfueled air vehicles and no hot work allowed in the hangar)
of air vehicles (e.g. fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, and/or
rigid/non-rigid airships), and special short-term events such as
public engagements. The plan is to restore Hangar 1 to all
current codes but assess the need for a Special Hazard Fire
Suppression System (like, hangar floor sprinklers or under
wing deluge system). The building code allows the exception
of Special Hazard Fire Suppression Systems under certain
circumstances. The California State Historic Preservation
Office recommended a risk assessment be performed to
evaluate the potential threat to the hangar of activities
performed inside of it.
This paper provides an overview of the resulting fire risk
assessment performed at NASA ARC in relation to the
renovation of the historic hangar 1.
2 METHODOLOGY
The goal was to assess the alternatives in a 5x5 risk
matrix. Managers at NASA ARC are comfortable with using
these risk matrices in making risk informed decisions.
Although routine in the aerospace program/project arena, this
risk informed decision making approach is gaining a strong
foothold in institutional or facility modification projects.
This was a limited-scope fire risk assessment for Hangar
1. The trade space was an analysis of the risk of major hangar
fire with and without a Special Hazard Fire Suppression
System for Hangar 1.
The authors chose to use the framework of a probabilistic
risk analysis, consisting of event trees and fault trees. Potential
accident sequences for a fire in Hangar 1 were developed in
the SAPHIRE [2] software code by developing event and fault
trees. The event tree displays an initiating event, which
disrupts normal operations, followed by a sequence of events
(in time) involving success and/or failure of system
components. Each path in the event tree is an accident
scenario sequence of systems that either succeed or fail during
the accident sequence.
Each accident sequence was assessed in terms of its
consequence and likelihood. The consequence is an
assessment of the worst credible potential result. The
likelihood is the probability that the identified accident
sequence will occur.
Initially, three event trees were created to assess:
• Aircraft Initiated Fire Risks in the Hangar
• Airship Initiated Fire Risks in the Hangar
• Short Term Special Event Fire Risks in the Hangar
These event trees resulted in various event sequences that
had consequences of major damage to the hangar, minor
damage, and negligible damage. An example initial event tree
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is shown in section 4. The event sequences resulting from a
major hangar fire were evaluated further in two subsequent
event trees — one with a Special Hazard Fire Suppression
System, and another without any Special Hazard Fire
Suppression System (see sections 5 and 6).
Fault trees were generated for all initiating events and
some pivotal events. They were used to generate the
probabilities of the events in the various event trees. For
reasons of conciseness, this paper only shows some of the
event trees and none of the fault trees.
The consequences in the two event trees with and without
Special Hazard Fire Suppression System were classified as
Catastrophic, Critical, Major, Minor, and Negligible.
Likelihoods were classified as Likely to occur, Probably will
occur, May Occur, Unlikely to occur, and Improbable to
occur, in the life of the facility, which for the purposes of this
analysis is assumed to be approximately thirty years.
Given the consequence and likelihood, the risk
assessment code is obtained from a 5x5 risk matrix shown in
Figure 4. The risk is qualitatively rated as high, medium, or
low (shown as red, yellow, or green in the matrix).
3 ASSUMPTIONS
Some of the major assumptions of the study are listed
here
It is assumed that the current Hangar 1 will be
completely renovated as per the Navy’s Engineering
Evaluation. All new structure, material and
components will be up to the current fire codes that
include adequate fire detection, alarms and water
supply system to the fire hoses. The hangar roof will
be accessible to firefighters as part of the upgrades.
The fire alarm system will have direct
communication with the ARC Emergency Dispatch
Center and the on-base Fire Station.
Future operations within Hangar 1 are limited to light
maintenance and storage of aircraft and airships, and
short term special events.
All Hangar 1 auxiliary shops and offices after
proposed renovations are assumed to be code
compliant.
Only fire risk was assessed for the hangar area, due to
initiating events either in the hangar area or in an
aircraft, airship or special event. Initiating fire events
in office spaces are covered by the fire codes and
were not addressed in the study. Other initiating
events, like seismic or storm events, were not
assessed.
Discussions with cognizant ARC personnel suggest
that a Special Hazard Fire Suppression System will
not be effective against a fire of the hangar itself, due
to the hangar’s very large volume and significant
height and width. The effectiveness of a Special
Hazard Fire Suppression System could not be
quantified; however, it was conservatively judged by
the authors to have a fifty-fifty effectiveness.
4 INITIAL EVENT TREES
This section shows one of the three initial event trees (see
Section 2) as an illustration of the methodology. The event
tree for an aircraft initiated risk of a “Major fire in Hangar 1”
is shown in Figure 1.
The initiating event is that a local fire starts in an aircraft
that is stored in the renovated hangar 1. This is assessed to be
“Probable” in the life of the hangar. Local fire detection,
meaning within the aircraft, occurs with a high probability.
When detected, the ARC Emergency Dispatch Center is also
alerted by phone. If the local-to-the-aircraft fire fighting (e.g.,
Figure 1 - Event Tree for Aircraft Initiated Hangar 1 Fire Risk
personnel with fire extinguishers) is effective on the unfueled
aircraft, it results in sequence #1 with a “Negligible Damage”
consequence and a “Probable” likelihood in the life of the
hangar. Event sequence #1 occurs whether or not there is a
Special Hazard Fire Suppression System and this risk is shown
in the risk assessment matrix of Figure 4.
Event sequence #2 occurs if local fire fighting is
ineffective and this results in a “Major fire in Hangar 1.”
Event sequence #3 occurs if the fire is not detected in time so
that this event sequence also results in a “Major fire in Hangar
1.” These two event sequences show that an aircraft related
fire initiating event can spread and become a “Major fire in
Hangar 1” with a “May Occur” likelihood in the life of the
hangar.
These sequences feed the initiating event in event trees of
“Fire Risk of Hangar 1 without any Special Hazard Fire
Suppression System” (Figure 2) and “Fire Risk of Hangar 1
with a Special Hazard Fire Suppression System” (Figure 3).
Note that the event tree of Figure 1 does not include the
ARC Fire Department's effectiveness in fighting the fire —
they are included in the event trees of Figures 2 and 3.
As mentioned in the methodology section, the study
included initial event trees for “Airship Initiated Fire Risks in
the Hangar” and “Short Term Special Event Fire Risks in the
Hangar.” Those initial event trees are not shown in this paper,
but they both had "Major fire in Hangar 1" sequences with
"May Occur" likelihoods. The “Major fire in Hangar 1”
sequences from all three initial event trees feed the event trees
of Figures 2 and 3.
5 RENOVATED HANGAR 1 WITHOUT ANY SPECIAL
HAZARD FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
This section assesses the first option in the trade study.
Here it is assumed that the proposed renovated Hangar 1 will
not have any Special Hazard Fire Suppression System like
hangar floor sprinklers or under wing deluge system.
The event tree in Figure 2 represents event sequences in
this trade study option that could lead to fire damage of
Hangar 1 where the initiating event is a “Major fire in Hangar
1.” The likelihood of this initiating event was assessed to be as
“May Occur” in the life of the hangar from an assessment of
the three event trees as described in the previous section.
The first branch that occurs in the event tree is fire
detection. One can get to this state with a locally undetected
fire (event sequence #3, Figure 1). Hence, this fire detection
event is different from the local fire detection event in the
initial event tree of Figure 1. Once the fire grows big enough it
can be detected outside the aircraft by the hangar fire detection
system. It was assessed that there is a high probability that a
major fire in the hangar would be successfully detected by the
new fire detection/alarm system, conversely it was assessed
that there is a low probability that fire detection would fail.
No branching occurs at the second branch since there is
no Special Hazard Fire Suppression System.
At the third branch, if the fire is detected the alarm is set-
off and the ARC Emergency Dispatch Center is notified. Since
the ARC fire station is very close to Hangar 1, the response (if
ARC Fire Department resources are in quarters and not
assigned to another emergency incident) should be immediate
and the team assessed that fire fighting should be effective
with a high probability occurrence; and only with a low
probability that fire fighting would be ineffective.
In the upper part of the event tree (Figure 2), a major fire
occurrence with effective fire fighting (event sequence #1)
was assessed to result in “Major damage” as a consequence
with likelihood that it “May Occur” in the life of the hangar. A
major fire with ineffective fire fighting (event sequence #2)
was assessed to result in “Critical Damage” as a consequence
with a likelihood of “Unlikely” to occur in the life of the
hangar. In the lower part of the event tree, if the major fire is
Figure 2 - Event Tree for Fire Risk of Hangar 1 without any Special Hazard Fire Suppression System
not detected automatically, it eventually will get detected by
personnel and the fire station notified. However, the
notification is relatively late in this case (as compared to when
the fire is automatically detected and the fire station is
automatically notified). So in this case late effective fire
fighting results in “Critical Damage” (event sequence #3).
Otherwise ineffective fire fighting (event sequence #4) would
result in “Catastrophic Damage” to the hangar, which was
judged to have an “Improbable” likelihood of occurrence in
the life of the hangar.
The resulting consequence / likelihood of these accident
sequence scenarios are shown in the risk matrix of Figure 4.
6 RENOVATED HANGAR 1 WITH SPECIAL HAZARD FIRE
SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS
This section assesses the second option in the trade study.
Here it is assumed that the proposed renovated Hangar 1 has a
Special Hazard Fire Suppression System. The event tree is
shown in Figure 3.
The initiating event (a major fire in hangar) in this event
tree represents the same initiating event used in the previous
event tree (Figure 2). The first pivotal event is fire detection
and it is the same in both event trees.
The second pivotal event is different in the two event
trees because of inclusion of the Special Hazard Fire
Suppression System. In this event branch, if the fire
suppression system is effective (event sequence #1, Figure 3),
it results in “Minor Damage” to the hangar with a “May
Occur” likelihood of occurrence in the life of the hangar. The
probabilities are obtained from one of the major assumptions
in section 2.
If the fire suppression system is not effective, fire fighting
efforts (event sequence #2, Figure 3) were judged to have a
high probability of limiting the fire damage. This pivotal event
is the same as in Figure 2. Event sequences 2 and 3 are
assessed to have “Major damage” and “Critical damage,”
respectively — just like in Figure 2. These event sequences
also occur with the same likelihood, the reason being that the
probabilities are reduced by a factor of two but not by an order
of magnitude. When fire is not detected automatically, the
lower part of the event tree of Figure 3, the accident sequences
are identical to previous event tree of Figure 2.
The resulting consequence likelihood of these accident
sequence scenarios are shown in the risk matrix of Figure 4.
Figure 3 - Event Tree for Fire Risk of Hangar 1 with a Special Hazard Fire Suppression System
7 CONCLUSION
Consequences and likelihoods of all event sequences in
the three initial event trees and the two trade study options
(with & without Special Hazard Fire Suppression System) are
displayed in the risk matrix of Figure 4. Other assessed risks
lower in either consequence and/or likelihood are not shown in
Figure 4. In essence, this risk matrix only shows the largest
risk boundary.
Examination of the risk matrix shows that there is very
little difference between the two options in terms of their
highest severity risk category — they are both yellow
reflecting a medium level of risk. Therefore, installation of a
Special Hazard Fire Suppression System does not appear to
reduce the risk category of a major fire in the hangar. In most
ARC applications, this risk can be accepted by a
project/facility with suitable examination of the accident
sequences and their risk management plan. Sensitivity analysis
on the major assumptions showed only small differences with
no change in the overall result.
The risk assessment process was very useful in discussing
the important issues between the Facilities Engineering
Division, Fire Protection Office, and the Safety and Mission
Assurance Directorate. The assessed risks were communicated
using the risk matrix to upper management. After internal State Historic Preservation Office. It was accepted by the
review, the risk assessment was provided to the California California State Historic Preservation Officer.
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Figure 4 - Fire Risk Assessment Matrix for Hangar 1
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